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Abstract.  This paper examines the economic case for the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
Agreement signed on January 6 th, 2004 by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, 
and the Maldives.  It starts with a detailed analysis of the preferential trading arrangements in South 
Asia to look at the region's experience to date and to draw lessons.  Specifically, the study examines 
the most effective free trade area in existence, i.e., the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Area, and evaluates 
the developments under the South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA).  The paper concludes that, 
considered in isolation, the economic case for SAFTA is quite weak.  When compared with the rest of 
the world, the region is tiny both in terms of economic size as measured by GDP (and per capita 
incomes) and the share in the world trade.  It is argued that prima facie, these facts make it likely that 
trade diversion would be dominant as a result of SAFTA.  This point is reinforced by the presence of 
high levels of protection in the region and the tendency of the member countries to establish highly 
restrictive ‘sectoral exceptions/sensitive lists' and stringent 'rules of origin'.  
  
We argue that SAFTA makes sense only in the context of a much broader strategy of creating a larger 
preferential trade area in the region that specifically would encompass China and the member nations 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations.  In turn, the case for the latter is strategic: the pursuit 
of regionalism in the Americas and Europe has created increasing discrimination against Asian exports 
to those regions, which must inevitably impact the region's terms of trade adversely.  An Asian bloc 
could be a potential instrument of changing incentives for the trade blocs in the Americas and Europe 
and forcing multilateral freeing of trade. 
 
Assuming that the SAFTA Agreement is here to stay, the paper also suggests steps to ensure that the 
Agreement can be made more effective in promoting intra-regional trade, while minimizing the likely 
trade-diversion costs and maximizing the potential benefits.  
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Preferential Trading in South Asia  
 
Tercan Baysan, Arvind Panagariya, and Nihal Pitigala  
 
Introduction: Background and Context 
 In the first three years of their independence, intra-regional trade among India, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka as a percentage of their total trade was in the double digits.  In part, this large proportion 
reflected the relatively protectionist trade regime in developed countries that had come to exist in the 
1930s and 1940s (Figure 2 in Annex).  But it also reflected low barriers to trade within the 
subcontinent.  In the subsequent years, while the developed countries opened their markets, thus, 
opening the door wider to trade between them and other countries including those in South Asia, the 
latter themselves turned inward.  Import-substituting industrialization, with massive public-sector 
participation in the production activity and tight control of the private sector, became the cornerstone 
of the development strategy pursued in the region. 
 The import-substitution policies worked towards limiting not just total trade but in some ways 
asymmetrically towards limiting intra-regional trade.  Once boundaries had been drawn between India 
and Pakistan, new industries were promoted and others expanded to deliberately replace imports from 
across the new borders. For example, before independence, most of Bengal’s jute had been grown in 
what became East Pakistan, and processed in jute textile mills in Calcutta.  After 1947, jute farming 
was promoted in India and protected by restricting the imports that had traditionally come from the 
East, while in East Pakistan jute textile mills were established to process jute and protected against 
competition from processed jute made in India.1 Similarly, imports of raw rubber that had previously 
come to India from Sri Lanka (as well as from Malaysia) were restricted in order to protect the 
development of a rubber industry in Kerala.2 
 Bangladesh emerged as an independent country in 1971 and chose to follow the same road.  
Two land-locked countries in the region, Nepal and Bhutan, had more open trade relations with their 
dominant neighbor, India, but followed similarly restrictive policies with respect to the rest of the 
world.  Consequently, while they began to trade more intensively with India, they too remained 
relatively closed with respect to the outside world.  The only exception to this general South Asian 
pattern was the Maldives, a tiny island state in the Indian Ocean.  
 With the exception of Sri Lanka, which had undertaken significant liberalization in the late 
1970s, anti-trade policies remained dominant in the region for nearly four decades.  The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the success of China under outward-oriented policies finally convinced the 
policy makers in the region that rapid growth could not be achieved without significant opening of 
their trade regimes. Unilateral trade liberalization policies, which had begun to be introduced in the 
second half of the 1980s, were introduced on a more systematic basis in the 1990s.  The change 
contributed to a more rapid expansion of trade of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal not only with 
the outside world but with one another as well. 
 Quite apart from the general opening up, the countries in the region also began to see 
increased cooperation and trade among themselves as a key objective.  This was reflected partially in 
the founding of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 to promote 
dialogue and cooperation.  In 1993, the member nations of SAARC went on to sign an agreement to 
                                                 
1 For details, see: World Bank (2004). Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview, Chapter 5, Volume II.  
2 See:  Pursell, G. and Pitigala, N. 2001. “Trade Agreements in the South Asia Region”.  World Bank (mimeo); and World 
Bank (2004), ibid, Chapter 5, Volume II.   
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forge the South Asian Preferential Trade Area (SAPTA), which became operational in December 
1995.  Though the actual exchange of preferences remained extremely limited, the process of 
negotiation kept the dialogue among the member countries alive. 
 But the worldwide proliferation of preferential trade arrangements in the last decade has now 
led to a change in thinking in the region, especially in India, which has begun to negotiate a series of 
preferential trade agreements of its own.  Within the region, this has recently led to the signing of the 
South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement with the ultimate objective of turning South Asia 
into a full-fledged FTA with the internal liberalization beginning in 2006.  This agreement has come in 
the wake of a bilateral FTA agreement between India and Sri Lanka in 1998 that became operational 
on March 1, 2000.  In addition, India has also had prior trade agreements involving Bhutan and 
Nepal.3 
 In this paper, we propose to carry out a detailed analysis of the preferential trade arrangements 
in the region.  We begin in Section I with the examination of the most effective FTA in existence in 
the region: the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Area (ISLFTA).4  We show that the agreement excluded 
outright many of the major sectors in which the countries had comparative advantage and imposed 
tariff-rate quotas (meaning the preferential tariff is applied up to a pre-specified quota while the ‘Most 
Favored Nation’ (MFN) tariff is applied to the out-of-quota imports) on many others.  The strict ‘rules 
of origin’ (ROO) further handicapped the potential expansion of intra-regional trade on a preferential 
basis in products that would have led to trade creation.  Nevertheless, the ISLFTA has led to a 
substantial expansion of bilateral trade between the two countries in both directions.  This has come 
about principally through the expansion of trade in products that were not traded or traded very little 
between the two countries previously and therefore presumably escaped the sectoral exclusions.  We 
cannot determine whether this expansion represents trade creation or trade diversion, however, since 
such determination requires information that we are not readily able to collect.  Future work that tracks 
the products experiencing large trade expansion will be useful to determine whether the expansion 
represented trade creation or trade diversion. 
 In Section II, we turn to the South Asia region as a whole and go over what is now familiar 
territory to the informed observers: the evolution of intra-regional trade and of the region’s preferential 
trade agreements, namely, SAPTA and SAFTA.  We show that after stagnating for several decades, 
following trade liberalization in the region in the 1990s, especially by India, intra-regional trade in 
South Asia has accelerated.  We then describe the SAPTA and SAFTA agreements as they stand 
currently. 
 In Section III, we turn to a critical examination of SAFTA.  We show that when compared 
with the rest of the world, the region is tiny both in terms of economic size as measured by GDP and 
share in world trade.  We argue that prima facie, this fact makes the likelihood of trade diversion being 
dominant as a result of the SAFTA likely.  This point is reinforced by the presence of the high level of 
protection in the region and the sectoral exceptions as also the rules of origin that are likely to be 
chosen.  We also offer a selective review of the partial- and general-equilibrium simulation studies that 
have been attempted to-date.  These studies show at best small benefits from SAFTA and at worst 
losses for some of the member countries.   
 In the last part, Section IV, we argue that considered in isolation, the economic case for 
SAFTA is quite weak.  Even when political factors are taken into account, the case that SAFTA is the 
first or even second-best instrument for alleviating the India-Pakistan conflict remains to be 
articulated.  Therefore, SAFTA makes sense only in the context of a much broader strategy of creating 
                                                 
3 For details on these agreements, see: World Bank (2004), ibid, Chapter 5, Volume II.      
4 As just noted, India also has trade agreements with Bhutan and Nepal, but these largely involve trade preferences by India 
to the two countries rather than FTA agreements. 
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a larger preferential trade area in the region that specifically would encompass China and the member 
nations of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).  In turn, the case for the latter is 
strategic: the pursuit of regionalism in the Americas and Europe has created increasing discrimination 
against Asian exports to those regions, which must inevitably impact the region’s terms of trade 
adversely.  An Asian bloc could be a potential instrument of changing incentives for the trade blocs in 
the Americas and Europe and forcing multilateral freeing of trade. 
 The final issue we tackle is how best to make SAFTA effective, assuming that it is here to 
stay.  We argue that if the deleterious trade diversion effects are to be minimized, it is important that 
the member countries move even more rapidly on their external liberalization both on a unilateral basis 
and within the multilateral context.  Moreover, the temptation to create long lists of sectoral 
exceptions should be resisted.  Also, the rules of origin should be liberal and take the across-the-board 
form rather than being different for different sectors and countries.  We also argue that the member 
countries should use the instrumentality of SAARC rather than SAFTA to promote economic 
cooperation in a variety of areas.  Using the SAFTA instrumentality for promoting trade as well as 
other agendas runs the risk that each can be held hostage to the progress in the other.  
I. THE INDIA-SRI LANKA FTA  
 We can analyze the ISLFTA at two levels.  First, we may ask how ex ante the choice of the 
sectors excluded from preferences, the phase out of tariffs, tariff-rate quotas and the rules of origin 
were influenced by what the countries saw as the comparative advantage of the partner.   And second, 
we may ask ex post what has been the impact of trade preferences on trade flows, again from the 
perspective of trade creation and trade diversion?  We begin by considering the first question. 
 Table 1 details the provisions of the FTA.  Of the total of 5,112 items,5 India placed 429 items 
on the negative list, meaning that no tariff preference is granted on these items.6  It gave Sri Lanka 
duty-free access on 1,351 items in the first year of the coming into force of the FTA. It also agreed to 
extend Sri Lanka duty-free status on 2,799 additional items in three years, extending 90 percent 
preference in the first year itself.  Thus, by March 1, 2003, India granted Sri Lanka duty free status on 
81 percent of the items.  Of the remaining items, 238 items receive a 50 percent tariff preference and 
528 items receive 25 percent preference starting the first year with no further expansion of the 
preference in the subsequent years.  Some key items are also subject to physical quotas beyond which 
the MFN tariff must be paid. 
 Sri Lanka took the negative-list exception for 1,180 or 23 percent of all items.  It gave India 
immediate duty-free access on 319 items.  On another 889 items, it gave 50 percent preference in the 
first year that will be expanded to 75 percent in the second and 100 percent in the third year.  On the 
remaining 2,724 items, the phase out period is eight years --35 percent preference at the end of the 3rd 
year, 70 percent at the end of the 6th and 100 percent at the end of the 8th year.  Thus, at the end of the 
8th year, Sri Lanka would have given duty-free status to India on 77 percent of all items. 
 On the surface, India’s offers to Sri Lanka look generous.  Yet, a closer examination of the 
data reveals that the products that Sri Lanka is capable of exporting to India are either excluded 
through the negative list or constrained by the quota.  Being a small economy, the production structure 
                                                 
5 At the 6-digit level of Harmonized System.  
6 However, India made an exception by extending partial preference on several apparel products that were otherwise on the 
negative list.  The motivation behind this provision is not clear to us though we speculate that the preference may be for a 
limited period so that India retains the right not to extend the preference beyond the specified period. 
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of Sri Lanka is highly specialized.  As such, even a small number of exceptions may be sufficient to 
constrain its potential exports. 
 This is eminently clear from Table 2, which shows the top 20 exports of Sri Lanka (to the 
world and not just India) at the 6-digit HS level along with the corresponding MFN and preferential 
tariff facing Sri Lanka in India as of March 1, 2001 (then in 2004).  These products account for 46 
percent of Sri Lanka’s total exports in 1999.  India subjects 15 out of these 20 products to either a 
tariff rate quota (meaning the tariff preference applies only up to a pre-specified quantity of imports) 
or negative-list exception.  The ROO and rules of destination requirements further restrict the exports.  
For example, apparel exports are not only subject to the tariff rate quota of 8 million pieces but at least 
6 million of these pieces should be manufactured from fabrics of Indian origin exported to Sri Lanka 
from India.  Likewise, exports of tea from Sri Lanka at the preferential tariff are not to exceed 12.5 
million kilograms within a calendar year.   Both products are also subject to a uniquely South Asian 
restriction that may be called ‘the rule of destination’: the preference applies only if the products enter 
through specific Indian ports.  Thus, the politics of exceptions is clearly stacked against the goods in 
which Sri Lanka is supposed to have a comparative advantage. 
 Purely from the static efficiency standpoint, the tariff-rate quota may be a useful device to 
minimize trade diversion.  As long as imports from Sri Lanka continue to come beyond the specified 
quota, at the margin, products from Sri Lanka still face the MFN tariff so that no trade diversion takes 
place.  All the tariff-rate quota does is to transfer the tariff revenue that would have been collected by 
India to the extent of the tariff preference on the quota is to Sri Lanka.  But from the viewpoint of Sri 
Lanka, the quota does limit the transfers since the preferential tariff does not apply to the out-of-quota 
exports.  These transfers could be substantial since the MFN rates applied by India to the out-of-quota 
imports (based on the simple average of the tariff rates) are set at the higher of 20 percent or the 
specific rates (see Table 2) for textiles and apparels, and 100 percent for tea in 2004.  The tariff-rate 
quota also rules out any expansion of the exports on account of the preference since the preference 
does not apply at the margin.  Of course, if the tariff-rate quota is non-binding, the traditional 
preferential trade analysis involving trade creation and trade diversion applies7  
 A similar story emerges with respect to the exports of India to Sri Lanka.  Table 3 lists India’s 
top 20 exports (to the entire world, including Sri Lanka) that account for 42 percent of its total exports.  
Seven of these twenty products are subject to the negative-list exception (including one with zero 
MFN rate).   Of the remaining thirteen products, four are subject to zero MFN tariff so that the 
preference is meaningless.  One more product is subject to 5 percent MFN tariff on which 35 percent 
tariff preference results in a preference of 1.75 percentage points.  The remaining seven products 
attract an MFN tariff rate of 10 percent on which the Indian products receive 3.5 percentage points 
preference that reduces the tariff rate to 6.5 percent.8 
 Alternatively, Tables 4 and 5 show how various concession categories of India and Sri Lanka 
relate to the volume of trade with the world as well as each other.  According to Table 4, 36 percent of 
India’s exports to Sri Lanka in 1999 were covered by the latter’s negative list.  Another 54 percent of 
the bilateral exports were in the category subject to the eight-year phase out.  Thus, only 10 percent of 
India’s 1999 exports to Sri Lanka were granted any immediate tariff preference.  Conversely, as shown 
in Table 5, even though the number of items placed by India on the negative list was relatively small –
                                                 
7 However, India has made an adjustment on the concessions for tea (Table 2, last column):  the previous 50 percent fixed 
concession rate on quota was made free, but is now subject to a 26 paise (cents) reduction per Kg. 
8 The updates for 2004 (last column in Table 3) show that there was an amendment to the original concession categories 
sometime between 2002 and 2004.  Four items which were under 8-year phased removal (35 percent by 2003) were made 
duty free with the other items remaining on the original schedule.  Another noteworthy feature that emerges from the new 
data is that Sri Lanka’s MFN tariff in 2004 shows an upward revision for most items compared to the 2001 rates. Twelve out 
of the 20 items show an increase in the MFN rates, while two items are subject to reduction in the rates; moreover, ad 
valorem duties on two have been converted to specific duties. 
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8.4 percent of the total tariff lines as opposed to 23 percent of all items placed on the negative list by 
Sri Lanka-- those items accounted for as much as 51 percent of Sri Lanka’s exports to the world.  Tea 
and textiles, both subject to tariff-rate quota, accounted for another 17 percent of the exports.9 
 Put another way, as Weerakoon (2001) points out in her excellent paper, at the time the lists of 
concessions were finalized, of the 319 items on which Sri Lanka offered zero duty to India, the latter 
exported only three items to the former.  Of the 2,907 products exported by India to Sri Lanka, only 21 
percent received any tariff preference at all.  Conversely, of the 1,351 items in the zero-tariff list of 
India, Sri Lanka exported only 68 items to the former.  Of the 380 items exported by Sri Lanka to 
India, 50 were on the Indian negative list, 44 received a 25 percent tariff preference, 218 received a 90 
percent preference (expanded to 100 percent from March 1, 2003) and 68 received a 100 percent 
preference. 
 This pessimistic ex ante political-economy analysis notwithstanding, how has the Sri Lanka-
India trade evolved in the wake of the signing of the ISLFTA.  Here we find a surprise.  Traditionally, 
the India-Sri Lanka trade has been relatively small.  As Figure 1 shows, imports from Sri Lanka as a 
proportion of India’s total imports (purple line) remained below 1 percent and showed a declining 
trend from late 1980s to early 1990s.  With the opening up by India in the early 1990s, the share began 
to pick up, but sharply declined again after peaking in 1996.  The recovery of the share was initially 
slow but picked up almost dramatically after the ISLFTA came into effect.  From 0.09 percent, the 
share shot up to 0.15 percent in the first two years of the ISLFTA. 
 Sri Lanka being small and India being large, the share of the latter in the total imports of the 
former is, of course, much larger.  As Figure 1 shows, this share had a slight upward trend during the 
1990s, which accelerated first in 1998 with unilateral liberalization by Sri Lanka and then again in 
2001 with the ISLFTA coming into effect.  During 1998-2002, the share has gone up from less than 10 
percent to more than 20 percent.  Since the effectiveness of ISLFTA alone, the expansion was from 12 
to 21 percent during 2000-2002. 
 The critical question one must answer is how the trade shares rose dramatically despite the 
apparent limited grant of preferences by the two sides.  The answer lies in the fact that the political-
economy pressures against preferences generally operate against the existing import from the partner 
country.  Goods that the partner country does not supply at the time of the negotiations do not pose an 
obvious threat and therefore manage to receive significant preferences.  And it is in these products that 
the scope for trade expansion can be quite large. 
 Detailed evidence presented in Table 6 shows that once the ISLFTA came into effect, the 
composition of traded goods at HS six-digit level of classification shifted dramatically.  The table is 
constructed as follows.  Take the upper part relating to the imports of India from Sri Lanka first.  We 
take the products with zero imports by India from Sri Lanka in 1999 and place them in category 1.  
Next, we stack the remaining products in the ascending order of the value of their imports by India 
from Sri Lanka in 1999 and then divide them such that each category contains 10 percent of the 
imports in 1999.  Because the bottom five products account for 50 percent of the imports by 
themselves and do not allow a neat division into categories with 10 percent imports each, we simply 
                                                 
9  However, these initial magnitudes and proportions might have changed with the phase-out of duties by the two countries 
since the Agreement became effective.   As shown in Table 1, 889 items on the three-year phase-out list extended to India by 
Sri Lanka and 2799 items on the three-year phase out list extended by India to Sri Lanka are currently duty free.  This might 
have impacted the trade between the two countries.  Overall, India enjoyed tariff preferences on 1208 tariff lines (or 23 
percent of total tariff lines), while Sri Lanka enjoyed tariff concessions by India on 4150 (or 79 percent of total tariff lines) as 
of 2003 March. 
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lump them together into a single category.  This gives us a total of seven categories with the first 
category accounting for no imports, next five accounting for 10 percent imports each and the seventh 
one accounting for 50 percent of the imports by India from Sri Lanka in 1999.  By construction, the 
second category of products individually contributed very little and therefore contains the largest 
number of products (except the first one, which contains products with zero bilateral imports by India 
in 1999). By the same token, the last category contains products that individually contributed the 
largest volume of bilateral imports in 1999 and hence contains the fewest products. We then fix the 
products in each category and compute the change in the share of the products in each category in the 
subsequent years. The bottom half of Table 6 carries out the same exercise for India’s exports to Sri 
Lanka. 
 The most striking feature of Table 6 is that the share of products in category 1 rises from zero 
to 38 percent in 2002!  Much of the expansion in trade comes from new products that were not 
previously exported by Sri Lanka to India at all.  Indeed, previously best-established exports (category 
7) lose the share in total exports dramatically from 50 percent in 1999 to just 19 percent. 
 The same pattern repeats itself, though in a slightly less pronounced form, in the exports of 
India to Sri Lanka.  The category with zero imports in 1999 rises to 10.5 percent in 2001 but falls back 
to 7.4 percent in 2002.  The next category, with least but positive imports initially (category 2) rises 
from 10 percent in 1999 to 39.5 percent in 2002!  The last category with just 3 products accounting for 
10 percent of all exports by India to Sri Lanka drops to 1 percent! 
 That ISLFTA has led to an expansion of bilateral trade between India and Sri Lanka is  not in 
a great deal of doubt unless we can think of an alterative explanation for the large expansion in the 
post-ISLFTA period.  But without knowing more, we cannot tell whether this expansion represents 
trade diversion from third countries or new trade that would not otherwise exist and therefore trade 
creation.  It could also represent trade deflection, though this is less likely unless the governments are 
failing to implement the ROO.10  The question whether the trade expansion represents trade creation or 
trade diversion is difficult to answer.  For example, consider a product whose imports into India from 
Sri Lanka expanded rapidly.  We must verify if India imported this product from outside prior to 
ISLFTA.  If not, the expansion clearly represents new trade and hence trade creation.  But in the more 
likely case that the product was previously also imported from outside countries, the determination is 
more difficult since we must then determine whether absent ISLFTA, India would have imported more 
of the product from outside countries. 
 Alternatively, we may examine the price effects of ISLFTA.  We may ask whether the 
ISLFTA led to a reduction in the prices of the products whose imports from Sri Lanka expanded. If 
yes, the expanded trade necessarily contains an element of trade creation since ceteris paribus, new 
trade must expand the total supply of the product in the Indian market.  But again, this is not as simple 
as it may sound, since the price may change because the world price itself changed.  
 
II. SAARC, SAPTA and SAFTA 
 Following the September 2003 Cancun Ministerial, the ongoing efforts on the part of the 
larger South Asian countries to hold discussions on bilateral FTA agreements with countries in the 
region and those outside the region have intensified.  Within the region, there are ongoing discussion 
                                                 
10 The Rules of Origin under ISLFTA stipulate that, in order to qualify for the preferential treatment, products not wholly 
produced in the exporting country must satisfy all of the following conditions: (i) foreign content must be no more that 65 
percent of the FOB (i.e., 35 percent local content); (ii) the product must undergo transformation at HS 4-digit level; and (iii) 
the final processing must take place in the exporting contracting party.  In addition, notwithstanding the transformation at the 
4-digit HS level, the following conditions are insufficient to qualify for preferences: simple processing, packaging, break-
bulk, assembly of consignments and simple mixing. 
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between Pakistan and Sri Lanka, between India and Bangladesh, and between Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka.  Outside the region, India recently signed a ‘Framework’ Agreement with Thailand for 
establishing an FTA, has been discussing another with Singapore, and carrying out discussion 
discussions with China.  Pakistan has recently signed a limited trade (‘Early Harvest’) pact with China 
to take effect from January 2006, with a view to moving to a full FTA in three years.  Another ‘Early 
Harvest’ agreement was signed with Malaysia.  And a trade and investment framework agreement 
(TIFA) has been signed with the United States, with the ultimate aim of an eventual FTA. Pakistan is 
also holding FTA discussions with Indonesia, Laos, Singapore, and Thailand, and these FTAs are 
expected to be negotiated in 2006.  And in July 2002, Sri Lanka and the United States signed a TIFA 
as a step towards forming a FTA.      
 Quite apart from these bilateral initiatives, efforts have been ongoing for a region-wide 
preferential trade area.  In the remainder of this paper we propose to focus on the analysis of these 
efforts.  As noted in the introduction, the initial efforts to form a PTA had culminated in the SAPTA in 
1993.  The SAPTA agreement provided for the exchange of tariff preferences among the member 
nations without commitment that such exchange would be carried out on a scale that would turn the 
region into a free trade area by a specified date.  As such that arrangement could not be termed as the 
South Asian Free Trade Area.  The SAPTA agreement made a distinction between the least developed 
and other developing member countries with the former consisting of Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and 
the Maldives and the latter India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  The agreement provided for Special and 
Differential Treatment for the LDC members and also included a “regional” MFN provision.  Thus, 
any preference extended within the SAPTA framework by a member that is not least developed to 
another that is also not least developed must be automatically extended to all SAPTA members.  The 
preferences granted by a non-LDC member to an LDC member must be automatically extended to all 
LDC members.  As a part of the SAPTA special and differential treatment provisions, non-LDC 
member countries are encouraged to offer one-way trade preferences to LDCs. 
 The SAPTA ‘rules of origin’ stipulate that if the products are not wholly produced or 
obtained11 within the member country, the total value of the materials, parts or other inputs originating 
from non-member states or of undetermined origin and used in the production of the exported product 
should not exceed 50 percent of the f.o.b. value and that the final processing of the product must be 
performed within the territory of the exporting member state.  The non-local inputs are valued at their 
c.i.f. prices where obtainable or otherwise at “the earliest ascertainable price”. The rule thus stipulates 
a minimum 50 percent of the f.o.b. value addition in the exporting member country to be eligible for 
SAPTA preference.  In order to encourage regional value addition, however, the agreement also allows 
for eligibility for an available tariff preference if within-union cumulative content is not less than 60 
percent of the f.o.b. price.  As a further exception to these rules, the agreement provides for a 
preference to the LDC members above and beyond the general and cumulative ROO, allowing an 
additional 10 percent to be applied to the f.o.b. value of imported inputs from both union and non-
union countries.  These ROO provisions have been a contentious issue and were subjected to 
continuous scrutiny by members who realized that the effective concessions under SAPTA was quite 
limited not just because the product coverage is limited (see below) but also because most member 
countries are unable to satisfy the stringent ROO.  After much resistance, principally from India, in 
1999, the local content requirement was reduced to 40 percent for non-LDC members and to 30 
percent for the four LDC members and the “cumulative” origin requirement was reduced to 50 
percent.   
 Despite three rounds of preference negotiations, the product coverage of SAPTA remained 
limited so that the arrangement remained ineffective.  An analysis of the top 20 export commodities of 
each member country demonstrates that the SAPTA resulted in significant preferences for only the 
least developed member countries.  Mukherji (2000) estimates that the annual value of all imports that 
                                                 
11 These include domestic raw materials, agriculture products, fish, waste and scrap and products wholly obtained from these. 
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entered the SAARC member countries under the SAPTA preferences amounted to approximately $480 
million at the end of the 1990s.  According to his calculations, the proportion of intra-regional imports 
covered by the SAPTA preferences was the highest for Pakistan (39.6 percent), followed by Nepal 
(35.2 percent), India (30 percent), Bhutan (17 percent) and Sri Lanka (12 percent). The import value 
coverage of Bangladesh and Maldives was marginal.  
 Nevertheless, the failure of the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun gave impetus to a more 
serious consideration of the regional option in South Asia, especially by India, and speeded up the 
move towards a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).12  The SAFTA accord, signed in 
January 2004, now proposes not only to turn the SAPTA into an FTA but goes beyond it by including 
in the core agreement provisions for trade facilitation, harmonization of customs classification, 
removal of restrictions on intra-regional investment, macroeconomic consultations, and development 
of communication systems and transportation infrastructure.  The agreement is to come into force on 
January 1, 2006. 
 Under the trade liberalization component, the member countries agree to gradually harmonize 
and eventually bring down their import tariffs on trade within SAFTA to 5 percent or less.  
Accordingly, in the first phase, the LDC members in SAFTA will reduce their maximum tariff rates to 
30 percent within two years from the date of coming into force of the Agreement (i.e., by January 1, 
2008).  The non-LDC members will reduce their maximum rates to 20 percent within the same time 
frame.  In the second phase, which will resume on January 1, 2008, the non-LDC members will reduce 
their import tariffs to 5 percent or less in 5 years (i.e., by January 1, 2013), while the LDCs will do the 
same in 8 years (i.e., by January 1, 2016).  The agreement allows the exclusion of “sensitive” items 
through member-specific negative lists, which are to be negotiated by the member countries.  
III. EVALUATING SAFTA13 
 The economic case for SAFTA is relatively weak.  Neither the qualitative arguments nor the 
quantitative assessments that are available give one reason to feel enthusiastic about the arrangement 
from an economic standpoint.  Nor does the experience with SAPTA and ISLFTA give one reason to 
hold optimism that the member countries will resist resorting to sectoral exclusions, strict rules of 
origin, and tariff-rate quotas to minimize trade diversion.  In our assessment below, we begin with the 
qualitative arguments and then summarize the available quantitative studies. 
a. Qualitative Arguments 
 A commonly used indicator to assess the desirability of an FTA is intra-regional trade as a 
proportion of the total regional trade.  It is claimed that the larger this trade, the more “natural” the 
union.  Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have systematically shown, however, that the extent of intra-
regional trade has little bearing on whether the union is beneficial or harmful in welfare terms except 
when all trade is already intra-regional in which case there is no extra-regional trade to divert and trade 
creation is the only possibility.  The reason is that the change in intra-regional trade due to a tariff 
preference at the margin bears no obvious relationship to the existing volume of intra-regional trade.  
Depending on the precise structure of the model, it is entirely possible that when intra-regional trade is 
small, its further expansion does not lead to the diversion of trade from extra-regional partners.  
Nevertheless, since intra-regional trade remains a key target of PTAs, without implying that its 
existing level suggests the likelihood of either trade creation or trade diversion dominating when the 
union is formed, we briefly describe its evolution in the present section. 
                                                 
12 The objective of converting the SAPTA into SAFTA had existed since 1997.  At the time, the date for making SAFTA a 
reality was set as 2001 but no real progress happened. 
13 For a general survey of the theory of preferential trading, see Panagariya (2000). 
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 Figure 2 shows the evolution of the total intra-regional trade in South Asia since the end of the 
British rule in the region.  Until 1951, this trade as a percentage of the region’s total trade was in the 
double digits.  As noted in the introduction, this pattern reflected two facts: the world markets were 
relatively closed and South Asia was relatively open.  In the years that followed, the two trade regimes 
exchanged places: the world markets opened up while South Asian borders became progressively 
closed.  Moreover, in the case of India and Pakistan, political tensions virtually closed official 
international trade between them.  By 1967, intra-regional trade had already fallen to just 2 percent of 
the region’s total trade.  It recovered briefly in the early 1970s but declined steadily thereafter until 
1990 when it was fell back to the 1967 level of 2 percent of total trade.  The share began to recover 
again only when the region, especially India, began to open its trade regime in the 1990s, reaching 4.2 
percent in 1999, and 4.4 percent in 2002.     
 We show country-level data on the direction of exports and imports in Tables 7 and 8, 
respectively.  The pattern at the country level essentially mirrors that at the aggregate level.  On the 
exports side, the countries trade mainly with developed countries and relatively little with South Asian 
partners.  For India and Pakistan, this fact also holds true on the imports side.  But Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka import as much as 20 and 15 percent of their respective total imports from South Asian sources, 
almost entirely from India. These volumes remain relatively small proportion of the total Indian 
exports, however.  What remains true is that even Indian exports to the South Asian partners have 
expanded significantly during the 1990s, rising from 3 percent in 1990 to 5 percent in 2002.  The 
change has come about mainly due to unilateral liberalization of the MFN tariffs in the region (see 
below). 
 Against this background, we see three important features of the South Asian economies that 
make an FTA among them economically unattractive.14  First, the economies are relatively small in 
relation to the world both in terms of the GDP and trade flows.  Table 9 shows the population, GDP 
and the volume of trade in the SAARC-5 (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) in the 
year 2001.  In terms of population, the region is substantial: one fifth of the world.  This clearly 
indicates the future potential of the market if per-capita incomes reach the levels prevailing currently 
in the ASEAN economies.  But the current per-capita incomes are tiny in relation to the latter so that 
the economic size of the region remains small: less than one twentieth of the world in terms of the 
GDP.  And if we take India out of the picture, this proportion drops to 0.4 percent.  The probability 
that the most efficient suppliers of the member countries are within the region is slim.  Therefore, the 
probability that the FTA is likely to be largely trade diverting is quite high. 
 Trade-related indicators reinforce this conclusion.  Thus, the last column of Table 9 shows the 
share of the SAARC countries in the world trade (exports plus imports as a proportion of the GDP).  
Together, the countries in the region account for only 1.1 percent of the world trade.  Again, if India is 
excluded, the proportion drops to 0.4 percent.  The scope for trade diversion due to tariff preferences is 
indeed very large. 
 The second reason for why prima facie the economic case for SAFTA is weak relates to the 
relatively high levels of protection among the SAARC economies.  If the country participating in a 
regional arrangement were itself open, it would not suffer from trade diversion even if it were tiny.  
For example, Singapore only stands to benefit from FTAs with other countries since its union partners 
must compete with the outside union countries on equal footing: everyone faces near zero tariffs in 
Singapore.  In an India-Singapore FTA, it is India that must suffer all the negative consequences of 
trade diversion.15  Against this background, it is useful to consider the existing trade barriers in the 
                                                 
14 Some of these concerns are discussed in greater detail with the associated analytics in Panagariya (2004). 
15 If the protection levels in a potential importing country are prohibitive, the inclusion of these industries in SAFTA could 
have substantial overall welfare benefits in the importing high protection country and generally for the region if the 
preferential exports are competitive and lead to substantial price reductions.  But even larger economic welfare benefits 
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SAARC countries.  This is done in Table 10.  It is evident that the level of protection within the 
SAARC region remains high in all countries except, arguably, Sri Lanka.  The simple average of the 
applied duties in non-agricultural goods ranges from 10.7 percent in Sri Lanka to 25.4 percent in 
Bangladesh.  In India, this tariff is approximately 20 percent.  In agriculture, the level of protection is 
even higher and ranges from 19.6 percent in Pakistan to 40 percent in India.  And Bangladesh, through 
the use of several para-tariffs on top of the customs duties, has recently raised nominal protection 
levels for many import substituting industries to very high levels. 16  
 The third and final reason that makes the economic case for SAFTA weak concerns the 
political economy of the selection of excluded sectors and ROO.  When countries are allowed to 
choose sectors that can be excluded from tariff preferences in an FTA, domestic lobbies make sure that 
the sectors in which they may not withstand competition from the union partner are the ones that get 
excluded.  On the other hand, lobbies go along with free trade in the sectors in which they are 
competitive and the preference will threaten the imports from outside countries.  In the same vein, 
lobbies tend to go for tight ROO or outright quantitative restrictions in precisely those in which they 
fear the competition from the partner most.  On the other hand, when the threat is mainly to the 
imports from outside countries, they are willing to accept greater liberalization.  This pattern was 
observed in our analysis of the ISLFTA above.  In addition, we may note that the ROO can also be 
subject to abuse by the bureaucrat administering them.  In cases where imports from the partner may 
be threatening an inefficient domestic competitor, bureaucratic discretion may be employed to block 
entry of the imports. 
 A common argument advanced in favor of SAFTA is that there is a substantial informal trade 
among the countries of the region (Table 11) and that this trade involves large real costs.  For example, 
the bulk of India-Pakistan trade is routed through Dubai, which is costly.  An FTA may help eliminate 
these costs.  There are three issues relating to this argument that must be examined critically.  First, in 
so far as the illegal trade between India and Pakistan is concerned, it is important to find out what part 
of it is due to the restrictions that preclude trade at the MFN terms and what part tries to evade even 
the MFN tariff.  Second, is it possible that informal trade is largely driven by considerations other than 
the evasion of tariffs?  A recent paper by Taneja, Sarvanathan and Pohit (2003) studies the transacting 
environments in the formal and informal trading between India and Sri Lanka.  They find that the 
transaction cost in formal trading in India as well as in Sri Lanka is significantly higher than in 
informal trading.  Thus, the presence of informal trade may simply reflect excessive transactions cost 
of passing the goods across the border through formal channels.  An FTA will likely add to this cost, 
especially for small and medium firms, by adding the costs of complying with the ROO.  Therefore, 
paradoxically, the FTA might divert trade from the low- to high-transactions cost channel.  Finally, 
even if the real costs associated with informal trade are higher (contrary to what the Taneja et al. study 
shows), benefits from such cost savings through the FTA must be weighed against the costs of trade 
diversion.17  
                                                                                                                                                        
would result in the importing country if it were to simply cut its general ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) tariffs, and the same 
reasons and pressures that explain the existence of the high MFN tariffs are likely to lead its negotiators to put these 
industries on negative lists or delay the introduction of reduced preferential tariffs.  As with protection policies generally, 
South Asian regional trade negotiations take account of the interests of producers and governments concerned about revenue 
losses, but very little weight is generally given to buyer  interests unless the products are intermediate inputs of interest to 
producer lobbies. 
 
16 For a detailed assessment and analysis of nominal protection levels in South Asian countries, see: The World Bank (2004), 
Trade Polices in South Asia: An Overview , (in three volumes). 
17  If informally traded products are included in bilateral FTAs or SAFTA, it is reasonable to expect that formal legal trade 
will to some extent replace the informal trade since one major reason for the informal trade is avoidance of the protective 
import duties.  However, for a number of reasons some --and in some products substantial volumes-- of informal trade is 
likely to continue.  First, at Customs formal imports are still subject to the importing countries’ domestic indirect taxes and 
other taxes (e.g., India’s “additional” duties, Pakistan’s sales tax and income withholding tax, and Bangladesh’s VAT and 
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 Given this pessimistic economic assessment, one may ask why has the move towards SAFTA 
gathered momentum.  The answer to this question appears to be rooted in the politics.  First, with most 
countries in the world moving forward with more and more PTAs, there is a clear sense in the region 
that it may be falling behind in this race.  There is an element of following the trend around the world 
and South Asia region can hardly remain immune to it.  Second, the region has definitely suffered 
from the trade diversion generated by the many FTAs in the Americas and EU and its neighbors.  The 
leaders in the region may therefore see a strategic advantage in forging ahead with as many of their 
own FTAs as possible in response. Third, politicians do not seem to distinguish between 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory liberalization as sharply as economists do.  As a result they see 
bilateral agreements as one of the instruments of liberalizing trade.  Sometimes they even see it as a 
superior instrument because it leads to reciprocal liberalization in the partner countries.  Finally, 
SAFTA is also seen as a vehicle of promoting better political ties among neighbors, especially India 
and Pakistan that have had a long history of rivalry.  The common example the proponents of this 
argument have in mind is that of the European Economic Community (EEC) which is claimed to have 
joined France and Germany into a tight economic union and made future conflicts between them very 
costly.18   
 In the context of SAFTA, this last argument has its limitations.  For example, one may argue 
whether SAFTA is itself feasible in the absence of political harmony between India and Pakistan.  The 
case of France and Germany involved a victorious power and a vanquished one and the military 
presence of an outside superpower that made compliance feasible.  The circumstances facing India and 
Pakistan are altogether different.   With an ongoing conflict and closed borders, they effectively deny 
the MFN status to each other.   
 But even if feasibility can be persuasively defended, one must ask whether SAFTA is the first-
best instrument of promoting peace between India and Pakistan.  For example, trade between them 
would likely grow substantially if they were to just open the borders to each other on a genuine MFN 
basis, which is a precondition for SAFTA in any case.  Moreover, even if preferential trade is an 
essential aspect of the promotion of peace, can this not be accomplished more directly by an India-
Pakistan bilateral FTA?  Or will the promotion of cultural ties through the movement of people across 
the border not be a more direct means of achieving the objective?  These are the tough questions that 
the proponents of the “peace argument” have not confronted to-date. 
b. Quantitative Studies of the SAFTA 
 Quite apart from the qualitative arguments, what do the quantitative studies say about 
preferential trade in the region?  Quantitative assessments of PTAs in general and SAFTA in particular 
fall into three categories.  First, we have gravity models that try to predict the impact of the 
arrangement on bilateral trade flows.  Second, we have the studies based on computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models that predict the effects of the arrangement on all variables including 
production, consumption, trade flows in all sectors of the economy as also on welfare.  Finally, we 
                                                                                                                                                        
advance income tax) which are avoided by informal importers.  Secondly, as noted above, formally traded goods may 
continue to face excessive transaction costs at Customs both at the export and import stages, and these transport costs and 
transaction costs including delays, “speed money” and bribes in negotiating these procedures may be considerably higher 
than the transaction costs and side payments of informal trade, especially for small scale businesses.  Thirdly, an important 
reason for informal trade in border areas --especially the border areas between India and Bangladesh and potentially between 
India and Pakistan-- are distances to the nearest regional Customs post, and rules which exclude many products from 
Customs clearance at these posts and require that they be transported long distances to a few larger offices for clearance. 
18 This argument, while quite fashionable, is not without flaws.  For one thing, it was the military presence of the United 
States in both Germany and Japan that ensured peace in the respective regions.  If the PTA was such a potent force, why is it 
that the U.S. military presence continued in Germany?  Indeed, no FTA or customs union was formed in the Far East and yet 
a lasting peace could be established there because the U.S. military was present in Japan.  Moreover, even without any 
regional arrangement, the Far Eastern economies have come to be as integrated economically as those in Europe.  
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have partial-equilibrium studies that try to capture the effects of trade preferences in specific sectors.  
All approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. 
 By construction, the gravity model is capable of answering only positive questions regarding 
the impact of the union on trade flows.  Some analysts have tried to draw normative inferences from it 
but such attempts are highly questionable.  Typically, the exercise involves estimating a bilateral 
trade-flow equation with bilateral trade (imports, exports or total trade at the aggregate or sector level) 
as the dependent variable and country characteristics such as the gross domestic products, population, 
land area, distance, the commonality of language or cultural ties and the existence of preferential trade 
arrangements as independent variables.  Once estimated, the equation can then be used to predict the 
impact of a union between country pairs that did not have such a union during the sample period. 
 The gravity equation, by construction, cannot predict the welfare effects of the FTA.  These 
depend not only on the extent of trade creation and trade diversion that the gravity equation does not 
readily predict but also on the associated trade barriers.  Even if trade creation is larger than trade 
diversion, if the diversion happens in sectors with very high tariffs and creation in sectors with very 
low tariffs, the welfare effects may be negative.  Analysts who have made claims of showing the 
welfare effects going one or the other way by comparing the extent of trade creation and trade 
diversion (the claims of whose measurement themselves remain questionable) might have simply 
missed this key point.19 
 The studies that employ the gravity model include Srinivasan and Canonero (1995) and 
Sengupta and Banik (1997).  Both studies predict that the impact of a South Asian FTA on trade flows 
will be small for India but much larger on the smaller countries.  Sengupta and Banik predict a 30 
percent increase in the official intra-SAARC trade and as much as 60 percent if illegal trade, which is 
currently out of the official count, becomes a part of official trade.  These results are intuitive: India 
being large, the impact on its trade of the FTA with the small neighbors cannot be proportionately 
large. 
 The second set of studies employ the computable general equilibrium models and have the 
virtue that they can predict the changes in consumption, production and trade at the sector level as also 
welfare as a result of the formation of the SAFTA.  But the reliability of these models is in serious 
question.  The model does not have predictive power in the way econometric models do since it uses 
the actual data from only one specific year called the base year.  It assumes a specific general-
equilibrium model structure and functional forms and, taking a subset of the parameter values as 
given, calibrates the remaining parameter values to reproduce the equilibrium in the base year.  The 
model is then shocked for the policy change in question and the new values of endogenous variable 
calculated. 
 Panagariya and Duttagupta (2001) demonstrate how the model structure, functional forms and 
parameter values can make even a qualitative difference to the results of the CGE models.  
Additionally, these models almost never incorporate the ROO.  Frequently, they also fail to 
incorporate new products that are now known to account for the bulk of the expansion of trade 
following the formation of FTAs.  As a result, as Kehoe (2003) demonstrates, not one of the numerous 
CGE models of NAFTA done prior to its signing came even close to predicting the actual outcome.  
For all these reasons, one can take the results of the studies with some grain of salt. 
                                                 
19 For welfare calculations, the theoretically relevant measures of trade creation and trade diversion are ex post with income 
levels allowed to change endogenously.  The commonly measured trade creation and trade diversion in the gravity equation 
hold all other variables including the income levels constant.  Nevertheless, investigators have employed the gravity equation 
to measure trade creation and trade diversion.  According to Hoekman (2004), the recent study by Dee and Gali (2003) finds 
“that the majority of PTAs in a sample of sixteen caused net trade diversion, including major PTAs such as NAFTA, the 
European Union and MERCOSUR.” 
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 Two studies that apply the CGE model to SAFTA are Pigato et al. (1997) and Bandara and Yu 
(2003).  Both employ the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database and model, though they 
differ in details due to the evolution of the GTAP itself.  Pigato et al. find that SAFTA produces 
benefits for member nations though unilateral trade liberalization yields larger gains.  Bandara and Yu 
(2003) find that SAFTA leads to a 0.21 percent gain in the real income of India and 0.03 percent gain 
for Sri Lanka.  Bangladesh loses 0.10 percent while the rest of South Asia gains 0.08 percent in terms 
of the real income.  Thus, the largest gain, which accrues to India, is a tiny 0.21 percent.  The authors 
compare these gains to other forms of liberalization and conclude as follows: “Our results support the 
pessimistic view and indicate that South Asian countries may gain much more from unilateral trade 
liberalization and multilateral liberalization than from the current SAPTA or proposed SAFTA.  
However, hypothetical FTAs between South Asia and NAFTA and the EU would also be beneficial in 
the region.” 
 Finally, a number of studies have employed partial-equilibrium models.  These models apply 
to specific sectors.  Their strength is that they can be (though they are not always) grounded better in 
the data and modified more readily to incorporate the details of policy and institutional factors specific 
to the sector such as the ROO and existing tariff preferences.  The weakness is that they ignore 
general-equilibrium interaction that can be important sometimes. 
 The studies applying the partial-equilibrium model include Govindan (1994), DeRosa and 
Govindan (1995) and Pursell (2004).  Govindan (1994) estimates the price elasticities of demand in 
food sector and uses them to estimate the effect of preferential liberalization within the region on intra-
regional trade.  He concludes that such liberalization would yield welfare gains through increased 
trade in food within the region.  DeRosa and Govindan (1995) extend the analysis to include unilateral 
liberalization and demonstrate that the gains are much larger when liberalization is on a non-
discriminatory basis. Pursell (2004) carefully studies the preferential liberalization of cement industry 
between India and Bangladesh, and finds substantial gains from increased competition within the 
regional market. 
 A key question is the direction the future work on SAFTA should take.  In view of the points 
made above, we suggest two types of studies: ex post evaluation of the arrangements such as the 
ISLFTA that are already in operation and ex-ante partial-equilibrium studies of the major sectors 
where trade creation and or trade diversion are likely.  The study by Pursell in the latter category offers 
a good model in terms of taking into account the important policy and transport-trade logistics details 
that are usually left out of the CGE studies. 
IV. Making the Most of SAFTA 
 The analysis in this paper shows that a persuasive case for the SAFTA remains to be made by 
its proponents.  Our own analysis in the light of the experience of the ISLFTA and SAPTA and the 
review of the available studies has failed to produce such a case.  Economically, the region is small in 
relation to the outside world and remains heavily protected.  Prima facie, these features imply that 
trade preferences to regional partners will likely be trade diverting rather than trade creating.  Based on 
the experience with the Sri Lanka-India FTA, the ROO and, tariff-rate quota and sectoral exceptions 
are more likely to restrict the expansion of intra-regional trade in precisely those sectors in which the 
countries have comparative advantage, that is, the sectors in which trade creation is more likely. 
 A political case for the SAFTA is often asserted by appeal to the experience of France and 
Germany but to-date its proponents have only asserted rather than articulated it.  The circumstances of 
France and Germany, after Germany had been decisively defeated and the Allied military forces 
occupied Germany, were quite different from those of India and Pakistan between which border 
hostility is ongoing and unresolved.  This difference raises serious doubts about successful 
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implementation of the SAFTA.  On the other hand, if the arrangement is implemented, it is not going 
to result in the kind of integration that took place among the member states of the European Economic 
Community for the simple reason that the EEC was a customs union that eventually aimed to even 
introduce factor mobility, whereas the SAFTA is intended to be an FTA that does not propose to even 
harmonize the custom tariff across nations.  Finally, it remains to be argued persuasively that the 
SAFTA is the best means to break the hostility between India and Pakistan. 
 Nevertheless, assuming the SAFTA is here to stay, what shape should it have so as to 
minimize its potential adverse effects and maximize its beneficial effects? For starters, it deserves 
repeating that the countries implement the SAFTA in earnest, meaning that they should:  
• minimize the sectoral/product exceptions; 
• have ‘rules of origin’ that are very liberal, simple, transparent, and remain the same for 
all products; 
• have clear rules against tariff-rate quotas; and  
• India and Pakistan move to MFN-based trade immediately. 
The more play these instruments get, the more likely that they will be used to exclude intra-regional 
trade that promotes competition among firms within the region and include intra-regional trade that 
displaces the more efficient outside suppliers.  
 In addition, we may consider several areas in which unilateral trade liberalization and actions 
within the multilateral context remain critically important and where possibilities of cooperation may 
exist.  Of course, in many cases, detailed and careful studies may be required before a final decision is 
made.  Among the areas are: 
• Unilateral and Multilateral Liberalization 
• Trade Facilitation 
• Harmonization of Standards and Policies 
• Meeting the SPS Standards in the Third Markets 
• Trade in Services 
• Infrastructure Cooperation 
In the following, we offer some preliminary remarks on each of these subjects. 
 Unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization. It is critical that the member nations continue 
to liberalize their external trade barriers both on a unilateral basis and within the multilateral context.  
As long as the external trade barriers of the nations are high, the risk of trade diversion effects 
dominating within the SAFTA remains serious.  In this respect, the region must avoid repeating the 
mistake committed by the countries in Latin America.  These countries effectively abandoned their 
unilateral trade liberalization programs once they began moving on the bilateral track.  The external 
trade barriers in South Asia being substantially higher than in Latin America, the countries in the 
region can hardly afford to freeze their unilateral liberalization programs.  In the same vein, the focus 
on the regional market should not divert attention from the much larger extra-regional markets.  This 
means active promotion of the multilateral negotiations since they will help open further the larger 
rich country markets.  
 Trade facilitation.  The region may also consider taking advantage of the instrumentality of 
SAFTA/SAARC in the area of trade facilitation.  The study by Taneja, Sarvanathan and Pohit (2003) 
reaches the conclusion that the cost of doing business through formal channels in the region is higher 
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than through informal channels.  While there are reasons to be skeptical of this very strong conclusion 
(for example, if this is true why does anyone trade through legal channels at all), it certainly points to 
very high costs of trading via the formal channels.20  Such costs are especially bothersome because 
unlike tariffs they do not even generate any revenue.  The countries in the region could cooperate on 
bringing down the costs of trade.  This will also generate positive externalities for trade costs with 
extra-union partners.  Trade facilitation has also been included in the Doha Round negotiations.  To 
the extent that the concerns of the SAFTA countries in this area may be similar, there may be benefits 
to result from consultation and cooperation and, if necessary, development of joint positions.  Given 
that the region’s outside trade is going to be expanding rapidly in the forthcoming years, the 
importance of precisely what is negotiated on trade facilitation as a part of the Doha Round can hardly 
be underestimated.  Finally, there may also be room for the SAFTA/SARC instrumentality to be used 
for cooperation with the Asia Pacific Economic cooperation (APEC) forum, which has a substantial 
program of trade facilitation as well.  The APEC work having progressed farther ahead in this area, 
there may be lessons to learn from it. 
 Harmonization of standards and policies. The third area in which suggestions have been 
made for regional cooperation concerns harmonization of standards and policies.  SAFTA itself lists 
banking practices as a target area for harmonization.  Of course, if  the region were to turn itself into  a 
customs union, which is the first important step towards creating a single market, there would be a 
strong case for such harmonization in areas such as competition policy, anti-dumping procedures and 
product standards --and, preferably, towards practices that give due consideration to the interests of 
consumers.  The case for harmonization is much weaker, however, within the context of a free trade 
area.  As such, while only further study of this subject can resolve more conclusively whether 
harmonization should be a major subject within the SAFTA framework, our preliminary view is 
pessimistic.  Unless we are dealing with a truly single market, it is not clear why Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka should harmonize their policies with those of India rather than more significant trading partners 
even if they do not have free trade area arrangements with the latter.  It may make more sense for the 
countries to go for the international “best practices” based on their income levels such that they 
facilitate both intra-regional and extra regional trade.  Of course, to a large degree, the move to the 
international best practices itself may result in a considerable harmonization. 
 Product safety and quality standards.  The fourth area in which cooperation is worth serious 
consideration is how best to meet the product standards, especially in agriculture, in the rich country 
markets.  With the mounting pressure on the rich countries to eliminate agricultural protection and 
subsidies, they are likely to increasingly adopt more rigorous sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards to protect domestic producers against foreign competition.  If the countries in the region are 
to take advantage of the eventual decline in the subsides and tariffs on agricultural imports in the rich 
countries, they will need to develop expertise in how best to satisfy that SPS measures as also how 
best to challenge them in the WTO if they happen to be imposed with protectionist intent and without 
sufficient health and safety justification.  Given the commonality of interests, there are possible 
synergies among the SAARC members in this area.   
 Trade in services.  The fifth area of cooperation is trade in services.  To-date, SAARC 
initiatives in the service sector have been limited to consultations related to the tourism sector and 
recommendations to regularize the informal labor movement on the basis of regional norms and 
mechanisms and evolving rules and procedures for particularly health and education. Yet, given that 
the restrictions on trade in services are more akin to quantitative barriers, the likelihood of trade 
diversion in them is lower than in goods.  Moreover, it may be easier to use the instrumentality of 
regional opening to open the market widely to all trading partners in the area of services.  As such, it 
may be worthwhile to study carefully the implications of the inclusion of services into the SAFTA 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that transaction costs associated with formal trade will likely go down with the reductions in protection 
levels.  
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agenda more centrally.  Opportunities for mutually beneficial trade may exist, for example, in the IT in 
which India is emerging as a leading exporter.  Likewise, there may be room for joint projects across 
borders in areas such as education and health. 
 Cooperation in infrastructure.  The final area of cooperation is infrastructure.  There can be 
issues of road and railway construction, building of bridges and telecommunication development in 
which the countries in the region have common interest.  Of course, the SAFTA is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for such cooperation but may play a facilitating role.  It should be remembered, 
however, that such cooperative projects should be subject to proper cost-benefit analysis since their 
opportunity cost is the alternative project forgone.  Preferential trade already tilts the balance in favor 
of intra-regional trade and there is no reason to add to that bias by building intra-regional transport and 
communications links at the cost of extra-regional links without a carefully analysis. 
 We conclude with a warning and a remark.  The warning is that the region should avoid 
substituting intra-regional trade liberalization for extra-regional liberalization.  The countries need to 
stay the course on their unilateral and multilateral liberalization.  Such a caution should be taken 
seriously: in the countries in Latin America that have gone whole hog for preferential liberalization, 
unilateral liberalization has come to a standstill.  Mexico, Brazil and Argentina have essentially 
suspended their unilateral trade liberalization programs in the past several years either because of 
protectionist pressures or in the hope that this will allow them to forge more preferential trade 
arrangements.  South Asia by itself is too small a region for which to sacrifice external liberalization. 
 Our concluding remark is that a persuasive case for SAFTA can only be made in two sets of 
circumstances.  First, if the countries in the region bring their tariffs down to 5 percent or below, the 
problem of trade diversion will be considerably reduced.  Such low tariffs will also minimize the 
impact of the ROO and sectoral exceptions.  Second, the SAFTA may be defensible as a part of a full-
fledged FTA in Asia.  An Asia-wide FTA will contain many efficient and competitive countries 
minimizing, once again, the possibility of trade diversion.  Moreover, such an FTA will also give the 
member countries a strategic advantage in stemming the tide of regionalism elsewhere in the world, 
namely, the Americas and Europe, by securing faster conclusion of the multilateral talks under the 
Doha Round.   
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Figure 1:  Bilateral Trade as a Proportion of the Total Trade between India and Sri Lanka 
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Fig 2: South Asia's Intra-regional Trade as a Share of Total Trade, 
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Table 1:  India-Sri Lanka FTA: Phase Out of Tariffs 
Tariff Preference Number of Tariff Lines (6 -digit H.S. Code) 
 Sri Lanka's Commitment 
India's Commitment
 
100 percent starting 1st year 319 1,351 
90 percent 1st year (100 percent by the end of 3rd 
year)  2,799 
50 percent 1st year (75 percent by 2nd and 100 by the 
end of 3rd year) 889  
50 percent in perpetuity (with Garment Quota) -- 233 
50 percent in perpetuity (with Tea Quota)  -- 5* 
25 percent in perpetuity (Textile Items) -- 528 
35 percent in 3rd, 70 percent in 6th and 100   percent 
in 8th year 2,724 -- 
None (Negative List) 1,180 429** 
      Total  5,112 5,112 
* A recent revision has adjusted preferential rates to Zero.  
** Inclusive of the 233 items of garments, which have been offered preferences.  
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Table 2:  Preferences by India to top 20 Exports of Sri Lanka 
HS Category Product Description Percent 
Total
Trade Regime in India (2001)  
MFN                                   ISLFTA 
Trade Regime in India (2004)  
MFN                                    ISLFTA
090240 Other black tea (fermented) 0.09 100% (Quota) 50% 100% (Quota) Free less 26 paise per kg. 
 
090230 Black tea (fermented) and partly 0.05 100% (Quota) 50%  100% (Quota)  Free less 26 paise per kg 
 
710239 Non-industrial--Other 0.04 30% 3% 20% Free 
621210 Brassieres 0.03 30% or Rs.30/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs15/ piece 20% or Rs.30/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs15/ piece 
 
620342 Trousers, bib and brace overalls, 0.03 30% or Rs.135/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs67.5/ piece  20% or Rs.135/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 67.5/ piece  
 
620520 Of cotton 0.02 30% or Rs.85/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs42.5/ piece  20% or Rs.85/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 42.5/ piece  
 
620333 Jackets and blazers-- Of synthetic 0.02 30% or Rs.320/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs160/ piece  20% or Rs.320/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 160/ piece  
 
620462 Trousers, bib and brace overalls, 0.02 30% or Rs.135/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs67.5/ piece  20% or Rs.135/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 67.5/ piece  
 
620469 Trousers, bib and brace overalls, 0.02 30% or Rs.135/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs67.5/ piece  20% or Rs.135/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 67.5/ piece  
 
880330 Other parts of airplanes or helicop 0.02 3% Free 3 % Free 
610510 Of cotton 0.02 30% or Rs.83/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs 41.5/ piece  20% or Rs.83/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs. 41.5/ piece  
 
610910 Of cotton 0.02 30% or Rs.45/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs22.5/ piece  20% or Rs.45/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 22.5/ piece  
 
710391 Worked--Rubies, sapphires 0.01 30% 3% 20 % 3 % 
620630 Of cotton 0.01 30% or Rs.95/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs47.5/ piece  20% or Rs.95/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 47.5/ piece  
 
620690 Of other textile materials 0.01 30% 15% 20% 15 % 
611020 Of cotton 0.01 30% or Rs.85/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs42.5/ piece  20% or Rs.85/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 42.5/ piece  
 
620433 Jackets and blazers--Of synthetic 0.01 30% or Rs.390/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs195/ piece  20% or Rs.390/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 195/ piece  
 
401290 Tires: Other 0.01 30% Negative 20% Negative 
620640 Of man-made fibers 0.01 30% or Rs.120/ piece (Quota) 15% or Rs60/ piece  20% or Rs.120/ piece  (Quota) 15% or Rs 60/ piece  
 
401519 Gloves--Other 0.01 30% 3% 20% Free 
       
Source: Tabulated from data obtained from Comtrade (WITS) and the Official Website of India’s Director General of Trade (http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/). 
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Table 3:  Preferences by Sri Lanka to top 20 Exports of India 
HS No. Description % of Total 
Exports 
(1999) 
Trade Regime in Sri Lanka (2001)  
 
MFN               ISLFTA (Preference margin) 
Trade Regime in Sri Lanka (2004) 
 
      MFN                              ISLFTA (Effective Duty)
710239 Non-industrial—Other 0.14 0 35% by 2003 0 Free 
271000 Petroleum oils and oils obtained fr 0.05 16.2% Negative 16.2% Negative 
711319 Of precious metal whether or not pl 0.03 10% 35% by 2003 28% 18.2% (free in 2008) 
100630 Semi-milled or wholly milled rice,  0.02 35% Negative Rs. 9 PK Negative 
030613 Frozen--Shrimps and prawns 0.02 10% Negative 15% Negative 
260111 Iron ores and concentrates, other t 0.02 5% 35% by 2003 2.5% 1.6% (free in 2008) 
610910 Of cotton 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
620630 Of cotton blouses 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
300490 Other medicaments 0.01 0 35% by 2003 0% Free 
620520 Of cotton men’s 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
294200 Other organic compounds. 0.01 0 35% by 2003 2.5% Free 
630492 Other—ot knitted or crocheted, 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
080132 Cashew nuts--Shelled 0.01 25% Negative 28% Negative 
610510 Of cotton 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
100190 Other wheat 0.01 0 Negative 2.5% Negative 
630790 Other 0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
170199 Other sugar 0.01 25% Negative Rs 4.5 PK Negative 
520710 Containing 85 % or more wgt. 0.01 0 35% by 2003 0 Free 
230400 Oil-cake and other solid residues,  0.01 10% 35% by 2003 15% 9.7% (free in 2008) 
380810 Insecticides 0.01 12.5% Negative 11% Negative 
Source: Tabulated from data obtained from Comtrade (WITS) and Sri Lanka Customs http://www.customs.gov.lk/guides/tariff/index.htm 
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Table 4: India’s Exports to Sri Lanka by Concession Categories 
Concession Type and 
Level 
No. of 
Tariff 
Lines  
% of Total Exports to 
WLD  
 % of Exports to Sri Lanka 
from Bilateral Total  
% Growth in 
Exports to Sri 
Lanka 
Sri Lanka’s 
Average MFN 
Tariff Rates 
  1999 2002 1999 2002 1999-2002 2001 
Nil (Negative List) 1180 20 25 
 
36 
 
48 
 
146 18.8 
100% (Zero duty) 319 3.6 
 
3.8 
 
0.8 
 
0.7 
 
64 4.3 
50% (Phased out to 100% 
in 3-years)  
889 4.5 
 
6.3 
 
8.8 
 
8.4 
 
75 5.2 
Up to 100% in 8 -years 2724 71 
 
65 
 
54 
 
43 
 
n.a. 9.2 
Total 5112 100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
  
Source: Tabulated from the data obtained from BOI Sri Lanka and Comtrade WITS 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Sri Lanka’s Exports by Concession categories 
Concession Type and Level % of Total Exports to 
WLD  
% of Exports to India 
from Bilateral Total 
% Growth 
in Exports 
to India 
India’s 
Average 
MFN Tariff 
Rates 
 
No. of 
Tariff Lines  
1999 2002 1999 2002 1999-2002 2001 
Negative List (Except 
Apparel) 
196 1.9  
 
2.0  
 
2.6 
  
0.6  
 
-20 40 
50% (fixed) -Apparel Quota  233 49.1 
 
47.9 
 
0.2 
 
0.09 
 
29 35 
100% (Zero duty) 1351 1.6 
 
1.2  
 
24.6 
 
10.1 
 
48 29.8 
90% (Phased out to 100% in 
3-years)  
2799 29.8  31.7 
 
67.6  
 
88.4  
 
493 29.7 
50% (fixed) -Tea Quota  5 14 
 
14 
 
5 
 
1 
 
-101 63.0 
25% (fixed) -Textile Items 528 3.4  3.0  
 
0.05 
  
0.01 
 
-27 29.2 
Total 5112 100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
  
Source: Tabulated from the data obtained from BOI Sri Lanka and Comtrade WITS. 
o  Garments are retained under the negative list despite 50% concession under quota. Negative List consist of 429 items   (Totals 
of rows 1 & 2). 
o  The apparel exports are subjected to an annual quota of 8 million pieces (which is equivalent to approximately 1% of Sri     
Lanka's total apparel exports in 2004).  
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  Table 6:  India: Distribution of Imports from and exports to Sri Lanka (1999-2002) 
Category Number of Products 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Imports 
1  0 28.0 30.6 38.0  
2 267 10 9.4 7.3 9.8  
3 21 10 7.6 6.6 6.7  
4 9 10 6.0 5.9 4.2  
5 3 10 7.3 4.0 6.9  
6 3 10 7.0 31.7 15.7  
7 5 50 34.7 13.7 19.0  
Exports 
1  0 4.6 10.5 7.4  
2 1929 10 18.4 27.0 39.5  
3 258 10 9.6 8.0 6.3  
4 109 10 8.4 7.1 4.9  
5 58 10 9.3 8.6 6.0  
6 37 10 11.1 8.7 6.2  
7 24 10 8.5 6.8 6.3  
8 13 10 10.4 6.8 9.2  
9 8 10 7.2 6.5 5.2  
10 5 10 7.1 8.0 8.0  
11 3 10 5.4 2.0 1.0  
     Source: Authors’ calculations using the U.N. Comtrade Data 
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Table 7:  Direction of Exports by Major Destinations (%) 
USA EU Japan Asean South Asia  
1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 
India 15 21 21 22 9 4 3 5 3 5 
Pakistan 12 25 36 27 8 1 3 2 4 2 
Bangladesh 32 35 32 50 4 2 1 0 2 2 
Sri Lanka 26 38 26 30 5 3 1 1 4 5 
 
 
Table 8:  Direction of Imports by Major Origins (%) 
US EU Japan ASEAN South Asia   
  1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 1990 2002 
India 11 7 22 20 8 3 3 5 0 1 
Pakistan 13 6 24 17 12 6 5 9 2 2 
Bangladesh 6 4 16 11 9 7 7 7 9 20 
Sri Lanka 8 4 16 15 12 6 9 8 7 15 
         Source: Comtrade via WITS 
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Table 9:  Population, GDP and Trade in SAARC-5 (2001) 
Country  Population (million) GDP ($ billion) Trade ($ Billion) 
Bangladesh 133.3 48.6 15.6 
India 1,032.40 477.4 93.1 
Nepal 23.6 5.8 2.3 
Pakistan 141.5 60 20.3 
Sri Lanka 18.7 16.4 11.1 
SAARC-5 1349.5 608.3 142.3 
World 6,130.10 31,400 12560.0 
    
          As % of World   
    
Country Population GDP Trade 
Bangladesh 2.2 0.2 0.1 
India 16.8 1.5 0.7 
Nepal 0.4 0 0.0 
Pakistan 2.3 0.2 0.2 
Sri Lanka 0.3 0.1 0.1 
SAARC-5 22 1.9 1.1 
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 
          Source: WDI (2003) 
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Table 10:  Simple Average of the Tariff Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank. 2004. Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview, Washington, D.C. (three volumes);  Central 
 Board of Revenue (Pakistan). 
 
 
 
 
 
 India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal 
 
 
1998-
99 
 2002-
03 
2004- 
05 
1998-
99 
2004-
05 
1998- 
99 
2004- 
05 
1998- 
99 
2004-
Jan 
1998-
99 
2002- 
03 
All tariff lines              
Customs duties (CD) 39.6 29.0 22.2 21.3 16.8 20.0 16.3 17.6 11.3 14.0 13.7 
Other general protective taxes  6.0 0  0  3.3  2.1  2.5 
Other selective protective taxes  0.0 0  0  6.4  0  0 
Total   35.0 22.2  16.8  26.5  13.4  16.2 
General maximum CD 45.0 30.0 30 35.0 25 40.0 25.0 35.0 27.5 80.0 25 
Other general protective taxes  6.0 0  0  4.0  3.5  3 
General maximum: CD+ other  36.0 30  25  29.0  31.25  28 
Non-agricultural tariffs              
Customs duties  27.4 19.7  16.6  15.6  8.8  13.8 
Other general protective taxes  5.9 0  0  3.9  1.9  2.8 
Other selective import taxes  0 0  0  5.9  0  0 
Total   33.3 19.7  16.6  25.4  10.7  16.6 
General maximum: CD+ other  36.0 20  25  29.0  31.3  28 
Agricultural tariffs              
Customs duties  40.6 40.1  18.1  19.7  24.6  13.5 
Other general protective taxes  6.5 0  0  3.7  3.5  2.8 
Other selective import taxes  0 0  0  8.7  0  0 
Total   47.1 40.1  18.1  32.1  28.1  16.3 
General maximum CD  100 100  25  25.0  27.5  25 
Other general protective taxes  8.6 0  0  4.0  3.8  3 
General maximum: CD+ other  108.6 100  25  29.00  31.3  28 
Notes: The averages are of non-preferential MFN rates as given in official tariff schedules and do not allow for 
SAPTA or other preferential rates. The 2004-05 tariffs in India are the rates which came into force on January 9, 2004 
in advance of the budget. The 2002-03 tariffs for Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal changed only slightly in 2003-04. 
Bangladesh figures are updated as of end June, 2004. All the Customs duty and other rates  are percent of assessable 
value (cif in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal, cif +landing charges in India and Bangladesh).   The  protective taxes 
other than Customs duties that have been (or were) allowed for are: in India, the Special Additional Duty (Sadd) , 
which was abolished in January 2004; in Bangladesh the IDSC, SD, RD and domestic VAT exemptions;  in Nepal the 
Security tax introduced in FY 2002, and in Sri Lanka the 20 percent Customs surcharge and the 1 percent Port and 
Airport Development Levy (PAL).  They do not allow for duty exemptions for inputs imported by exporters. They 
also do not allow for exemptions and partial exemptions which are separate from the general tariff schedules and 
which are often use and/or user-specific. The "general maximum" Customs duty rate is defined as a rate which 
includes at least 5percent of total tariff lines, and above which there are no more than 10percent of total tariff lines.  
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Table 11: Informal Trade between India and its SAAARC Partners 
Trading Partner (year of 
estimate) 
Indian informal exports  
($US million) 
Indian informal imports     
($US million) 
Pakistan (1996) 100-500 n.a. 
Bangladesh (1992-93) 299 14 
Sri Lanka (1991) 142 121 
Sri Lanka (2000-01) 185 21 
Sources: 
 
Pakistan: Government of Pakistan (1996; Nabi et. al.). Provides two estimates: the “low” estimate (based 
on visits to various markets for smuggled goods) suggests Indian informal exports to Pakistan were 
US$100 million and the “high” estimate (based on interviews with customs officials) estimates about US$ 
500 million.  Taneja (1999) and Rao et al (1996, p.23) cite The Economist (1996) as reporting informal 
exports worth $2 billion from India to Pakistan in 1996. 
Bangladesh:  V. L. Chaudhary (1995), based on a detailed survey of Bangladesh-India informal trade. 
Sri Lanka:  Sarvanathan (1994) gives the estimates for the year 1991 and N.Taneja (2002) gives the one for 
2000-2001. 
 
